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RECENT DECISIONS
AnMIRALTY-CoNFLICT OF LAws-EmB R. R. Co. v. ToMPKINS D1sMARrrn.m MATIERs-Plaintiff, a resident of Massachusetts,
brought suit in the law side of the federal district court in Massachusetts for
injuries sustained as a passenger aboard defendant's ship while it was docked
in Sweden. Defendant, a Swedish corporation, defended on the ground that a
contract stipulation as expressed on the back of plaintiff's ticket relieved it of
liability. The ticket had been purchased in Sweden. The lower court, citing
only American authorities, held that the. effect of the contract provision was to
relieve defendant. On appeal, held, remanded. The cause of action asserted is
a maritime tort; hence the substantive law to be applied is the general maritime
law as finally determined by the federal courts, including the federal conffict
of laws rule, which requires that the effect of the contract provision be determined by Swedish law. Jansson v. Swedish American Line, (1st Cir. 1950)
185 F. (2d) 212.
The principal case is held not to fall within the rule of Erie R. R. Co. v.
T ompkins,1 whereby a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must follow
state substantive law. While there is no doubt that conffict of laws questions
generally fall within the Erie rule,2 the court excepts cases covered by general
maritime law, as dealing with questions arising under the Constitution and laws
of the United States and reviewable by the Supreme Court. The diversity of
citizenship present between the parties is held not to be a prerequisite for
jurisdiction in a federal court in actions at law. The case then stands as a
further development defining the limits of Southern Paci-fie Company v. Jensen8
and Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,4 whereby there was established a uniform maritime law which could not be diversified by state action. Once the
matter is determined to be within uniform maritime coverage, the court's holding that federal rather than state law should apply seems correct,5 although
there have been recent cases holding that a maritime subject matter is not in
TINGUISHED IN

1304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
2Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941).
3244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524 (1917). See also Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U.S. 149, 40 S.Ct. 438 (1920).
4 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501 (1918).
5 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872 (1946)) (federal law
court must follow general maritime law in remedy for unseaworthiness).
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itself sufficient to grant jurisdiction in a federal court in actions at law. 6 It is
analogous to other areas of federally created rights and obligations where federal
"common law" has remained. 7 As stated by Justice Black, the purpose of the
Erie case was not to bring within the governance of state law matters so vitally
affecting relations of the Federal Government as to require uniform national disposition.8 It is noted that the Erie rule is in effect not circumvented, as state
courts must also follow the federal rule in this area.9 State law may supplement
maritime law outside this area, the state action not being hostile to the "characteristic features of the maritime law or inconsistent with federal legislation,"10 which
will be recognized in a federal court in actions at law11 as well as in admiralty.12
(Of course, an admiralty court is not obligated by the Erie rule, not being a
court of diversity jurisdiction.13) As established by precedent, the permissive
area of local variation is principally confined to state death14 and survival statutes15 relating to deaths within jurisdictional waters, and insurance16 and workmen's compensation17 schemes covering maritime workers engaged in local
activity.18 The court would appear correct in including in uniform coverage
conffict of laws rules, for such by their very nature substantively affect other

6 McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 888; Erlich
v. Wilhelmsen, (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 414; Stamp v. Union Stevedoring Corp.,
(D.C. Pa. 1925) 11 F. (2d) l 72.
7 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573 (1943) (determining rights under commercial paper issued by the United States); Deitrick v. Greaney,
309 U.S. 190, 60 S.Ct. 480 (1940) (rights under federal statute); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301, 67 S.Ct. 1604 (1947) (tortious claim of the
United States).
8 See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, supra note 7.
9 Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 63 S.Ct. 246 (1942) (suit in
state court for maintenance and cure).
10 Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 388, 61 S.Ct. 687 (1941) (state survival statute
upheld).
11 See Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 794. In a fed-eral law action, Judge Hand applies the general maritime law of unseaworthiness remedy,
taking note that it is the same law which a New York state court would apply.
12 Just v. Chambers, supra note 10; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 42
-S.Ct. 89 (1921) (state wrongful death statute).
13 See Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 at 465, 62 S.Ct. 676 (1942).
14 Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398, 28 S.Ct 133 (1907).
·Compare Puleo v. Moss & Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 842, cert. den. 331 U.S. 847,
67 S.Ct. 1733 (1947) (admiralty court held state law to be referred to in determining
validity of claim under state death statute) and Riley v. Agwilines, Inc., 296 N.Y. 402,
73 N.E. (2d) 718 (1947) (wrongful death statute applied, but general maritime law
referred .to in determining liability).
15 Just v. Chambers, supra note 10.
16 Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306, 63 S.Ct. 1067 (1943).
17 Davis v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of Washington, 317 U.S. 249, 63 S.Ct. 225
{1942).
18 For a discussion of the muddied area in determining how far a state may cover
maritime workers with state compensation, see Dickinson and Andrews, "A Decade of Admiralty in the Supreme Court of the United States," 36·CALIP. L. RBv. 169 at 176 et seq.
,(1948).
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than purely local matters. 19 There would be little trouble but for recent unfortunate decisions and dicta by the Supreme Court. First, it has been suggested
that the whole concept of uniformity in general maritime law is restricted to
workmen's compensation matters,20 which has produced further decisions suggesting that admiralty courts should follow local state law otherwise. 21 Yet
these cases on their facts relate to matters occurring within the state jurisdiction,
while the broad concept of uniformity has subsequently been reaffirmed. 22
Secondly, in Caldarola v. Eckert,23 the Supreme Court held that a state court
could preclude a remedy for a maritime tort occurring within its waters, although
admittedly cognizable in admiralty. It would thus appear that the uniformity
demanded in an admiralty court need not extend to a state law court. It could
be concluded therefore that federal courts formerly bound to follow general
maritime law in actions at law would now be free to follow local state variations
even in matters uniformly treated in an admiralty court, by an application of the
Erie rule. The principal case rejects any such conclusions. The concept of a broad
area of uniformity is relied upon, binding upon both admiralty, and federal and
state law courts. 24 By pointing out, however, that a court hearing a maritime
question within this area need not rest on diversity jurisdiction, thus not being
within the Erie rule, it indicates that even should a state court be allowed
variation, a federal court in an action at law should follow the general law.
Thomas Hartwell, S.Ed.

10 Regarding the question of whether the admiralty rule of comparative negligence or
the common law rule allowing contributory negligence as a bar should apply in a suit at
law on a maritime cause of action, federal cases have applied the common law rule. See
Johnson v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., (2d Cir. 1928) 24 F.
(2d) 963, reversed on other grounds, 280 U.S. 320, 50 S.Ct. 118 (1930); United States
v. Norfolk-Berkley Bridge Corp., (D.C. Va. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 115. But see Intagliata v.
Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 26 Cal. (2d) 365, 159 P. (2d) I (1945), where
the admiralty rule is applied. The court reasons that Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.,
supra note 9, requires uniform treatment in law and admiralty.
20 See Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, supra note 16.
21 See Guerrini v. United States, (2d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 352, cert. den. 335 U.S.
843, 69 S.Ct. 65 (1948). Here an admiralty court looked to New York law to determine
the duty owned by shipowner to a subcontractor injured while working on New York
waters. See also The Big Chief, (D.C. Mo. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 268.
22 See Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., supra note I I.
23 332 U.S. 155, 67 S.Ct. 1569 (1947).
24 The court recognizes that a Massachusetts state court would follow the general maritime law. Thomeal v. Cape Pond Ice Co., 321 Mass. 528, 74 N.E. (2d) 5 (1947).

